| Summary: | One of the concerns of philosophical theorising about private law is to understand the kinds of reasons – the kinds of normative considerations – that properly bear upon the justification of private law normative incidents (interpersonal legal rights, duties, liabilities, powers, and so on) and the interrelationship between these considerations. One view is that reasons which are not grounded in the normative relationship between persons or, more specifically, their freedom-grounded moral rights and duties, are completely excluded. On such a monistic view, there is then no real question of the interrelationship between relational reasons and others. Other views accept that different reasons – such as reasons grounded in the consequences of liability – do bear upon private normative relations. The theoretical task is then to articulate, at a general level, how these reasons interact. For instance, do relationally grounded reasons have a normative priority of some kind (if so, what kind?) over other kinds of reasons?...
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