Expressiveness and Nash equilibrium in iterated Boolean games
We define and investigate a novel notion of expressiveness for temporal logics that is based on game theoretic equilibria of multi-agent systems. We use iterated Boolean games as our abstract model of multi-agent systems [Gutierrez et al. 2013, 2015a]. In such a game, each agent has a goal , repres...
Main Authors: | Gutierrez, J, Harrenstein, P, Perelli, G, Wooldridge, M |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Association for Computing Machinery
2021
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