The contours of control
Necessarily, if S lacks the ability to exercise (some degree of) control, S is not an agent. If S is not an agent, S cannot act intentionally, responsibly, or rationally, nor can S possess or exercise free will. In spite of the obvious importance of control, however, no general account of control ex...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer Netherlands
2014
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| _version_ | 1797052956296609792 |
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| author | Shepherd, J |
| author_facet | Shepherd, J |
| author_sort | Shepherd, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Necessarily, if S lacks the ability to exercise (some degree of) control, S is not an agent. If S is not an agent, S cannot act intentionally, responsibly, or rationally, nor can S possess or exercise free will. In spite of the obvious importance of control, however, no general account of control exists. In this paper I reflect on the nature of control itself. I develop accounts of control’s exercise and control’s possession that illuminate what it is for degrees of control—that is, the degree of control an agent possesses or exercises in a given circumstance—to vary. Finally, I demonstrate the usefulness of the account on offer by showing how it generates a solution to a long-standing problem for causalist theories of action, namely, the problem of deviant causation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:37:44Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:0bd79124-12d9-4066-a6c0-16eacf817dd3 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:37:44Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | Springer Netherlands |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:0bd79124-12d9-4066-a6c0-16eacf817dd32022-03-26T09:31:34ZThe contours of controlJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:0bd79124-12d9-4066-a6c0-16eacf817dd3Ethics (Moral philosophy)Practical ethicsEthics of the biosciencesPhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetSpringer Netherlands2014Shepherd, JNecessarily, if S lacks the ability to exercise (some degree of) control, S is not an agent. If S is not an agent, S cannot act intentionally, responsibly, or rationally, nor can S possess or exercise free will. In spite of the obvious importance of control, however, no general account of control exists. In this paper I reflect on the nature of control itself. I develop accounts of control’s exercise and control’s possession that illuminate what it is for degrees of control—that is, the degree of control an agent possesses or exercises in a given circumstance—to vary. Finally, I demonstrate the usefulness of the account on offer by showing how it generates a solution to a long-standing problem for causalist theories of action, namely, the problem of deviant causation. |
| spellingShingle | Ethics (Moral philosophy) Practical ethics Ethics of the biosciences Philosophy Shepherd, J The contours of control |
| title | The contours of control |
| title_full | The contours of control |
| title_fullStr | The contours of control |
| title_full_unstemmed | The contours of control |
| title_short | The contours of control |
| title_sort | contours of control |
| topic | Ethics (Moral philosophy) Practical ethics Ethics of the biosciences Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT shepherdj thecontoursofcontrol AT shepherdj contoursofcontrol |