Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?
Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent...
Main Author: | Cunningham, J |
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Format: | Journal article |
Published: |
Springer Netherlands
2017
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