Cognitive homelessness

There is a constant temptation in philosophy to postulate a realm of phenomena in which nothing is hidden from us. Rene Descartes thought that one's own mind is such a realm. Ludwig Wittgenstein' enlarged the realm to everything that is of interest to philosophy. That they explained this s...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Williamson, T
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. 1996
Subjects:
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author Williamson, T
author_facet Williamson, T
author_sort Williamson, T
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description There is a constant temptation in philosophy to postulate a realm of phenomena in which nothing is hidden from us. Rene Descartes thought that one's own mind is such a realm. Ludwig Wittgenstein' enlarged the realm to everything that is of interest to philosophy. That they explained this special feature in very different ways hardly needs to be said; what is remarkable is their agreement on our possession of a cognitive home in which everything lies open to our view. Much of our thinking – for example, in the physical sciences – must operate outside this home, in alien circumstances. The claim is that not all our thinking could be like that.
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spelling oxford-uuid:0cb81df8-8def-42b3-8776-e66eb024055b2022-03-26T09:36:31ZCognitive homelessnessJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:0cb81df8-8def-42b3-8776-e66eb024055bPhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetJournal of Philosophy, Inc.1996Williamson, TThere is a constant temptation in philosophy to postulate a realm of phenomena in which nothing is hidden from us. Rene Descartes thought that one's own mind is such a realm. Ludwig Wittgenstein' enlarged the realm to everything that is of interest to philosophy. That they explained this special feature in very different ways hardly needs to be said; what is remarkable is their agreement on our possession of a cognitive home in which everything lies open to our view. Much of our thinking – for example, in the physical sciences – must operate outside this home, in alien circumstances. The claim is that not all our thinking could be like that.
spellingShingle Philosophy
Williamson, T
Cognitive homelessness
title Cognitive homelessness
title_full Cognitive homelessness
title_fullStr Cognitive homelessness
title_full_unstemmed Cognitive homelessness
title_short Cognitive homelessness
title_sort cognitive homelessness
topic Philosophy
work_keys_str_mv AT williamsont cognitivehomelessness