The constraint against doing harm and long-term consequences
Many people hold the constraint against doing harm, the view that the reason against doing harm is stronger than the reason against merely allowing harm, everything else being equal. Mogensen and MacAskill (2021) have recently argued that when considering indirect long-term consequences of our every...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Brill
2023
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| _version_ | 1797110363585511424 |
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| author | Unruh, CF |
| author_facet | Unruh, CF |
| author_sort | Unruh, CF |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Many people hold the constraint against doing harm, the view that the reason against doing harm is stronger than the reason against merely allowing harm, everything else being equal. Mogensen and MacAskill (2021) have recently argued that when considering indirect long-term consequences of our everyday behavior, the constraint against doing harm faces a problem: it has the absurd implication that we should do as little as possible in our lives. In this paper, I explore the view that, for behavior that does not increase anyone’s ex ante risk of suffering harm, the reason against doing harm is not stronger than the reason against merely allowing harm, everything else being equal. I argue that this view is plausible, show how it solves the paralysis problem, and defend it against objections. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:53:56Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:0d0c0c24-8a64-4774-b75f-e5a09105505a |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:53:56Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Brill |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:0d0c0c24-8a64-4774-b75f-e5a09105505a2023-08-10T14:52:24ZThe constraint against doing harm and long-term consequencesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:0d0c0c24-8a64-4774-b75f-e5a09105505aEnglishSymplectic ElementsBrill2023Unruh, CFMany people hold the constraint against doing harm, the view that the reason against doing harm is stronger than the reason against merely allowing harm, everything else being equal. Mogensen and MacAskill (2021) have recently argued that when considering indirect long-term consequences of our everyday behavior, the constraint against doing harm faces a problem: it has the absurd implication that we should do as little as possible in our lives. In this paper, I explore the view that, for behavior that does not increase anyone’s ex ante risk of suffering harm, the reason against doing harm is not stronger than the reason against merely allowing harm, everything else being equal. I argue that this view is plausible, show how it solves the paralysis problem, and defend it against objections. |
| spellingShingle | Unruh, CF The constraint against doing harm and long-term consequences |
| title | The constraint against doing harm and long-term consequences |
| title_full | The constraint against doing harm and long-term consequences |
| title_fullStr | The constraint against doing harm and long-term consequences |
| title_full_unstemmed | The constraint against doing harm and long-term consequences |
| title_short | The constraint against doing harm and long-term consequences |
| title_sort | constraint against doing harm and long term consequences |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT unruhcf theconstraintagainstdoingharmandlongtermconsequences AT unruhcf constraintagainstdoingharmandlongtermconsequences |