Panic-based overfishing in transboundary fisheries

This paper analyses sustainability of bilateral harvesting agreements in transboundary fisheries. Harvesting countries obtain public and private assessments regarding their stock of fish, and the stock experiences ecological changes. In addition to biological uncertainty, countries may face strategi...

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Main Author: Vosooghi, S
Format: Journal article
Published: Springer Verlag 2018
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author Vosooghi, S
author_facet Vosooghi, S
author_sort Vosooghi, S
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description This paper analyses sustainability of bilateral harvesting agreements in transboundary fisheries. Harvesting countries obtain public and private assessments regarding their stock of fish, and the stock experiences ecological changes. In addition to biological uncertainty, countries may face strategic uncertainty. A country that receives negative assessments about the current level of fish stock, may become ‘pessimistic’ about the assessment of the other coastal state, and this can ignite ‘panic-based’ overfishing. The paper examines the likelihood of overfishing and suggests a unique prediction about the possibility of abiding by bilateral fishing agreements. Conditions under which the outcome of the asymmetric-information model reduces to the symmetric-information game are discussed, and optimal policy instruments for intergovernmental management of the stock are offered.
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spelling oxford-uuid:0d669dd1-fd79-40bf-b049-9491174427532022-03-26T09:40:19ZPanic-based overfishing in transboundary fisheriesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:0d669dd1-fd79-40bf-b049-949117442753Symplectic Elements at OxfordSpringer Verlag2018Vosooghi, SThis paper analyses sustainability of bilateral harvesting agreements in transboundary fisheries. Harvesting countries obtain public and private assessments regarding their stock of fish, and the stock experiences ecological changes. In addition to biological uncertainty, countries may face strategic uncertainty. A country that receives negative assessments about the current level of fish stock, may become ‘pessimistic’ about the assessment of the other coastal state, and this can ignite ‘panic-based’ overfishing. The paper examines the likelihood of overfishing and suggests a unique prediction about the possibility of abiding by bilateral fishing agreements. Conditions under which the outcome of the asymmetric-information model reduces to the symmetric-information game are discussed, and optimal policy instruments for intergovernmental management of the stock are offered.
spellingShingle Vosooghi, S
Panic-based overfishing in transboundary fisheries
title Panic-based overfishing in transboundary fisheries
title_full Panic-based overfishing in transboundary fisheries
title_fullStr Panic-based overfishing in transboundary fisheries
title_full_unstemmed Panic-based overfishing in transboundary fisheries
title_short Panic-based overfishing in transboundary fisheries
title_sort panic based overfishing in transboundary fisheries
work_keys_str_mv AT vosooghis panicbasedoverfishingintransboundaryfisheries