Instant Exit from the War of Attrition.

This paper takes a new look at the classic concession game. It argues that exit from an asymmetric war of attrition is likely to be instant. Selecting a unique equilibrium using a "craziness" pertubation device, it finds a notion of stochastic strength determines the outcome, with a stocha...

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Xehetasun bibliografikoak
Egile nagusia: Myatt, D
Formatua: Working paper
Hizkuntza:English
Argitaratua: Nuffield College (University of Oxford) 1999
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Gaia:This paper takes a new look at the classic concession game. It argues that exit from an asymmetric war of attrition is likely to be instant. Selecting a unique equilibrium using a "craziness" pertubation device, it finds a notion of stochastic strength determines the outcome, with a stochastically weaker player giving up immediately.