Reply to Quong, Patten, Miller and Waldron
<p>This is a reply to four critics of my book Liberalism’s Religion: Jonathan Quong, Alan Patten, David Miller and Jeremy Waldron, whose essays have been published in a Special Issue of Criminal Law and Philosophy.</p> <p>I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss Liberalism’s...
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Format: | Journal article |
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Springer Nature
2020
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author | Laborde, C |
author_facet | Laborde, C |
author_sort | Laborde, C |
collection | OXFORD |
description | <p>This is a reply to four critics of my book Liberalism’s Religion: Jonathan Quong, Alan Patten, David Miller and Jeremy Waldron, whose essays have been published in a Special Issue of Criminal Law and Philosophy.</p>
<p>I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss Liberalism’s Religion with the prominent political theorists assembled in this Special Issue. Jonathan Quong and Alan Patten offer detailed critical engagement with my theory of state legitimacy and religious exemptions. Each defends a version of liberalism where one notion (neutrality, public justification, or fairness) can do most of the work; whereas I argue in Liberalism’s Religion that such unitary theories are too vague and abstract to deliver practical ethical guidelines on their own. I defend a more fine-grained, more structured and more pluralist liberal political theory. David Miller and Jeremy Waldron, for their part, develop or comment on some central claims of Liberalism’s Religion. Both encourage me, in different ways, to reflect on the deeper compatibility between liberalism and religion. In what follows, I respond to my critics (Quong and Patten) at length, before raising some questions for Miller and Waldron.</p> |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:49:23Z |
format | Journal article |
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institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:49:23Z |
publishDate | 2020 |
publisher | Springer Nature |
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spelling | oxford-uuid:0fab6d7b-21ba-4fcb-95ab-51a2a3f509862022-03-26T09:52:27ZReply to Quong, Patten, Miller and WaldronJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:0fab6d7b-21ba-4fcb-95ab-51a2a3f50986EnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer Nature2020Laborde, C<p>This is a reply to four critics of my book Liberalism’s Religion: Jonathan Quong, Alan Patten, David Miller and Jeremy Waldron, whose essays have been published in a Special Issue of Criminal Law and Philosophy.</p> <p>I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss Liberalism’s Religion with the prominent political theorists assembled in this Special Issue. Jonathan Quong and Alan Patten offer detailed critical engagement with my theory of state legitimacy and religious exemptions. Each defends a version of liberalism where one notion (neutrality, public justification, or fairness) can do most of the work; whereas I argue in Liberalism’s Religion that such unitary theories are too vague and abstract to deliver practical ethical guidelines on their own. I defend a more fine-grained, more structured and more pluralist liberal political theory. David Miller and Jeremy Waldron, for their part, develop or comment on some central claims of Liberalism’s Religion. Both encourage me, in different ways, to reflect on the deeper compatibility between liberalism and religion. In what follows, I respond to my critics (Quong and Patten) at length, before raising some questions for Miller and Waldron.</p> |
spellingShingle | Laborde, C Reply to Quong, Patten, Miller and Waldron |
title | Reply to Quong, Patten, Miller and Waldron |
title_full | Reply to Quong, Patten, Miller and Waldron |
title_fullStr | Reply to Quong, Patten, Miller and Waldron |
title_full_unstemmed | Reply to Quong, Patten, Miller and Waldron |
title_short | Reply to Quong, Patten, Miller and Waldron |
title_sort | reply to quong patten miller and waldron |
work_keys_str_mv | AT labordec replytoquongpattenmillerandwaldron |