Ambiguity aversion and the absence of wage indexation

This paper analyzes optimal wage contracting assuming agents are not subjective expected utility maximizers but are, instead, ambiguity (or uncertainty) averse decision makers who maximize Choquet expected utility. We show that such agents will choose not to include any indexation coverage in their...

पूर्ण विवरण

ग्रंथसूची विवरण
मुख्य लेखकों: Mukerji, S, Tallon, J
स्वरूप: Working paper
प्रकाशित: University of Oxford 2002
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Ambiguity Aversion and the Absence of Wage Indexation. द्वारा Mukerji, S, Tallon, J

प्रकाशित 2004
Journal article
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Ambiguity Aversion and the Absence of Wage Indexation. द्वारा Mukerji, S, Tallon, J

प्रकाशित 2002
Working paper