(Implicit) Knowledge, reasons and semantic understanding
This paper exploits recent work on the normative and constitutive roles of knowledge in practical rationality (Hornsby 2007, Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, Hyman 1999, 2015), to put pressure on the idea that speakers could communicate without exploiting linguistic knowledge. I defend cognitivism about...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Langue: | English |
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Wiley
2020
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| Résumé: | This paper exploits recent work on the normative and constitutive roles of knowledge in practical rationality (Hornsby 2007, Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, Hyman 1999, 2015), to put pressure on the idea that speakers could communicate without exploiting linguistic knowledge. I defend cognitivism about meaning, the view that speakers have rationally accessible (i.e. implicit rather than tacit) knowledge of semantic facts and principles, and that this knowledge is constitutive of their linguistic competence. |
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