Aquinas on humility and relational greatness
Humility is a practically orphaned virtue in contemporary virtue ethics, and its theological associations in classical and medieval texts do not, at first glance, commend humility in a secular world. In response, I examine in this chapter the place accorded to humility in Aquinas’s relational virtue...
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| Format: | Book section |
| Language: | English |
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Routledge
2020
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| _version_ | 1797054174987288576 |
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| author | Pinsent, A |
| author2 | Alfano, M |
| author_facet | Alfano, M Pinsent, A |
| author_sort | Pinsent, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Humility is a practically orphaned virtue in contemporary virtue ethics, and its theological associations in classical and medieval texts do not, at first glance, commend humility in a secular world. In response, I examine in this chapter the place accorded to humility in Aquinas’s relational virtue ethics. I begin by showing how the four species of pride he identifies inhibit flourishing from both a first- and second-person perspective, and how Aquinas’s defends both humility as a guardian of relationships and a concomitant virtue of greatness. I conclude by observing how Aquinas’s account of humility also transposes into a more secular framework, given the need for a disposition to protect the many interpersonal relationships and their fruitfulness that are associated with human flourishing. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:53:31Z |
| format | Book section |
| id | oxford-uuid:110b8ab8-cb7a-4fe5-b918-355bd65bd3ea |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:53:31Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | Routledge |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:110b8ab8-cb7a-4fe5-b918-355bd65bd3ea2022-03-26T10:00:04ZAquinas on humility and relational greatnessBook sectionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_3248uuid:110b8ab8-cb7a-4fe5-b918-355bd65bd3eaEnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordRoutledge2020Pinsent, AAlfano, MLynch, MPTanesini, AHumility is a practically orphaned virtue in contemporary virtue ethics, and its theological associations in classical and medieval texts do not, at first glance, commend humility in a secular world. In response, I examine in this chapter the place accorded to humility in Aquinas’s relational virtue ethics. I begin by showing how the four species of pride he identifies inhibit flourishing from both a first- and second-person perspective, and how Aquinas’s defends both humility as a guardian of relationships and a concomitant virtue of greatness. I conclude by observing how Aquinas’s account of humility also transposes into a more secular framework, given the need for a disposition to protect the many interpersonal relationships and their fruitfulness that are associated with human flourishing. |
| spellingShingle | Pinsent, A Aquinas on humility and relational greatness |
| title | Aquinas on humility and relational greatness |
| title_full | Aquinas on humility and relational greatness |
| title_fullStr | Aquinas on humility and relational greatness |
| title_full_unstemmed | Aquinas on humility and relational greatness |
| title_short | Aquinas on humility and relational greatness |
| title_sort | aquinas on humility and relational greatness |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT pinsenta aquinasonhumilityandrelationalgreatness |