Incentive complexity, bounded rationality and effort provision
Using field and laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that the complexity of incentive schemes and worker bounded rationality can affect effort provision, by shrouding attributes of the incentives. In our setting, complexity leads workers to over-provide effort relative to a fully rational benchmar...
Main Authors: | Abeler, J, Huffman, D, Raymond, C |
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Format: | Working paper |
Language: | English |
Published: |
University of Oxford
2023
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