Incentive complexity, bounded rationality and effort provision
Using field and laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that the complexity of incentive schemes and worker bounded rationality can affect effort provision, by shrouding attributes of the incentives. In our setting, complexity leads workers to over-provide effort relative to a fully rational benchmar...
Main Authors: | Abeler, J, Huffman, D, Raymond, C |
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פורמט: | Working paper |
שפה: | English |
יצא לאור: |
University of Oxford
2023
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פריטים דומים
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Reference Points and Effort Provision.
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יצא לאור: (2009) -
Reference Points and Effort Provision.
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יצא לאור: (2011) -
Reference Points and Effort Provision
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יצא לאור: (2011) -
Toward general robustness evaluation of incentive mechanism against bounded rationality
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Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision
מאת: Ederer, F, et al.
יצא לאור: (2018)