On the explanatory power of hallucination
Pautz (Perceiving the world , 2010) has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistem...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer Verlag
2016
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| _version_ | 1797054615879942144 |
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| author | Alford-Duguid, D Arsenault, M |
| author_facet | Alford-Duguid, D Arsenault, M |
| author_sort | Alford-Duguid, D |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Pautz (Perceiving the world , 2010) has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:59:42Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:1316bfc1-a00c-4242-99b4-5a23c13ffb5a |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:59:42Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Springer Verlag |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:1316bfc1-a00c-4242-99b4-5a23c13ffb5a2022-03-26T10:11:51ZOn the explanatory power of hallucinationJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:1316bfc1-a00c-4242-99b4-5a23c13ffb5aEnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordSpringer Verlag2016Alford-Duguid, DArsenault, MPautz (Perceiving the world , 2010) has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large. |
| spellingShingle | Alford-Duguid, D Arsenault, M On the explanatory power of hallucination |
| title | On the explanatory power of hallucination |
| title_full | On the explanatory power of hallucination |
| title_fullStr | On the explanatory power of hallucination |
| title_full_unstemmed | On the explanatory power of hallucination |
| title_short | On the explanatory power of hallucination |
| title_sort | on the explanatory power of hallucination |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT alfordduguidd ontheexplanatorypowerofhallucination AT arsenaultm ontheexplanatorypowerofhallucination |