Indiscernible universals

Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible u...

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主要作者: Rodriguez-Pereyra, G
格式: Journal article
出版: Routledge 2016
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author Rodriguez-Pereyra, G
author_facet Rodriguez-Pereyra, G
author_sort Rodriguez-Pereyra, G
collection OXFORD
description Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that postulating indiscernible universals can allow a theory of universals to identify particulars with bundles of universals, and that postulating indiscernible universals can allow a theory of universals to develop an account of the resemblance of quantitative universals that avoids the objections that Armstrong’s account faces. Finally, I shall respond to some objections and I shall undermine the criterion of distinction between particulars and universals that says that the distinction between particulars and universals lies in that while there can be indiscernible particulars, there cannot be indiscernible universals.
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spelling oxford-uuid:13c18775-3f4b-45f7-8fcd-8c6b7ad0a4b82022-03-26T10:15:42ZIndiscernible universalsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:13c18775-3f4b-45f7-8fcd-8c6b7ad0a4b8Symplectic Elements at OxfordRoutledge2016Rodriguez-Pereyra, GUniversals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that postulating indiscernible universals can allow a theory of universals to identify particulars with bundles of universals, and that postulating indiscernible universals can allow a theory of universals to develop an account of the resemblance of quantitative universals that avoids the objections that Armstrong’s account faces. Finally, I shall respond to some objections and I shall undermine the criterion of distinction between particulars and universals that says that the distinction between particulars and universals lies in that while there can be indiscernible particulars, there cannot be indiscernible universals.
spellingShingle Rodriguez-Pereyra, G
Indiscernible universals
title Indiscernible universals
title_full Indiscernible universals
title_fullStr Indiscernible universals
title_full_unstemmed Indiscernible universals
title_short Indiscernible universals
title_sort indiscernible universals
work_keys_str_mv AT rodriguezpereyrag indiscernibleuniversals