Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utilities and externalities
We provide a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to solve games with non-transferable utilities and externalities. We show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegoiated. In the original game derived from these payoff configurations, we can fin...
Prif Awdur: | Karos, D |
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Fformat: | Working paper |
Cyhoeddwyd: |
University of Oxford
2015
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Eitemau Tebyg
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Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
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