Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utilities and externalities
We provide a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to solve games with non-transferable utilities and externalities. We show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegoiated. In the original game derived from these payoff configurations, we can fin...
Hovedforfatter: | Karos, D |
---|---|
Format: | Working paper |
Udgivet: |
University of Oxford
2015
|
Lignende værker
-
Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
af: Karos, D
Udgivet: (2015) -
Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility
af: Tiago Pinto, et al.
Udgivet: (2021-01-01) -
Coalition formation in general apex games
af: Karos, D
Udgivet: (2013) -
An elementary transfers procedure for sharing the joint surplus in games with externalities
af: Joss Erick Sánchez-Pérez
Udgivet: (2023-07-01) -
Coordinated adoption of social innovations
af: Karos, D
Udgivet: (2016)