Hate speech laws: expressive power is not the answer

According to the influential “expressive” argument for hate speech laws, legal restrictions on hate speech are justified, in significant part, because they powerfully express opposition to hate speech. Yet the expressive argument faces a challenge: why couldn't we communicate opposition to hate...

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Main Author: Lepoutre, M
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press 2020
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author Lepoutre, M
author_facet Lepoutre, M
author_sort Lepoutre, M
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description According to the influential “expressive” argument for hate speech laws, legal restrictions on hate speech are justified, in significant part, because they powerfully express opposition to hate speech. Yet the expressive argument faces a challenge: why couldn't we communicate opposition to hate speech via counterspeech, rather than bans? I argue that the expressive argument cannot address this challenge satisfactorily. Specifically, I examine three considerations that purport to explain bans’ expressive distinctiveness: considerations of strength; considerations of directness; and considerations of complicity. These considerations either fail to establish that bans are expressively superior to counterspeech, or presuppose that bans successfully deter hate speech. This result severely undercuts the expressive argument's appeal. First, contrary to what its proponents suggest, this argument fails to circumvent the protracted empirical controversies surrounding bans’ effectiveness as deterrents. Second, the expressive argument appears redundant, because bans are expressively distinctive only insofar as hate speech is already suppressed.
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spelling oxford-uuid:173aa194-fa96-494a-9f77-b9edaf7bfee02022-03-26T10:35:59ZHate speech laws: expressive power is not the answerJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:173aa194-fa96-494a-9f77-b9edaf7bfee0EnglishSymplectic ElementsCambridge University Press2020Lepoutre, MAccording to the influential “expressive” argument for hate speech laws, legal restrictions on hate speech are justified, in significant part, because they powerfully express opposition to hate speech. Yet the expressive argument faces a challenge: why couldn't we communicate opposition to hate speech via counterspeech, rather than bans? I argue that the expressive argument cannot address this challenge satisfactorily. Specifically, I examine three considerations that purport to explain bans’ expressive distinctiveness: considerations of strength; considerations of directness; and considerations of complicity. These considerations either fail to establish that bans are expressively superior to counterspeech, or presuppose that bans successfully deter hate speech. This result severely undercuts the expressive argument's appeal. First, contrary to what its proponents suggest, this argument fails to circumvent the protracted empirical controversies surrounding bans’ effectiveness as deterrents. Second, the expressive argument appears redundant, because bans are expressively distinctive only insofar as hate speech is already suppressed.
spellingShingle Lepoutre, M
Hate speech laws: expressive power is not the answer
title Hate speech laws: expressive power is not the answer
title_full Hate speech laws: expressive power is not the answer
title_fullStr Hate speech laws: expressive power is not the answer
title_full_unstemmed Hate speech laws: expressive power is not the answer
title_short Hate speech laws: expressive power is not the answer
title_sort hate speech laws expressive power is not the answer
work_keys_str_mv AT lepoutrem hatespeechlawsexpressivepowerisnottheanswer