Perceptual knowledge of nonactual possibilities
It is widely assumed that sense perception cannot deliver knowledge ofnonactual (metaphysical1) possibilities. We are not supposed to be able to knowthat a propositionpis necessary or thatpis possible (ifpis false) by senseperception. This paper aims to establish that the role of sense perception is...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2016
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| Summary: | It is widely assumed that sense perception cannot deliver knowledge ofnonactual (metaphysical1) possibilities. We are not supposed to be able to knowthat a propositionpis necessary or thatpis possible (ifpis false) by senseperception. This paper aims to establish that the role of sense perception isnot so limited. It argues that we can know lots of modal facts by perception.While the most straightforward examples concern possibility and contingency,others concern necessity and impossibility. The possibility of a perceptual routeto some modal knowledge is not as radical as it may at first sound. On thecontrary, acknowledging it has benefits. |
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