Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the 'Extended Mind'
This paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning self-regulation generally. Neither shame nor guilt is more other-independent than the other. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not a mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is more char...
| मुख्य लेखक: | |
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| स्वरूप: | Journal article |
| प्रकाशित: |
Firenze University Press
2016
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| _version_ | 1826261512977645568 |
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| author | Harcourt, E |
| author_facet | Harcourt, E |
| author_sort | Harcourt, E |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning self-regulation generally. Neither shame nor guilt is more other-independent than the other. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not a mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is more characteristic of a well-functioning moral consciousness. Then, relying on phenomena described by ‘extended mind’ theorists, I argue that a common view of self-regulation in children – that it is importantly other-dependent – is also true of adult self-regulation. But that is all the more reason to think that other-dependence and a well-functioning moral consciousness can go together. Moreover, since shame and guilt are one aspect of self-regulation, if other-dependence can be a characteristic generally of our well-functioning self-regulation – the ‘macro’ thesis – this supports the ‘micro’ thesis that other-dependence can characterize the well-functioning of both shame and guilt. The conclusion is that heteronomy lies not in the fact of other-dependence but in the nature of the dependence. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:22:37Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:1a9e1383-6d9f-4376-9daa-da31967919d0 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:22:37Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Firenze University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:1a9e1383-6d9f-4376-9daa-da31967919d02022-03-26T10:55:50ZMoral Emotion, Autonomy and the 'Extended Mind'Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:1a9e1383-6d9f-4376-9daa-da31967919d0Symplectic Elements at OxfordFirenze University Press2016Harcourt, EThis paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning self-regulation generally. Neither shame nor guilt is more other-independent than the other. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not a mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is more characteristic of a well-functioning moral consciousness. Then, relying on phenomena described by ‘extended mind’ theorists, I argue that a common view of self-regulation in children – that it is importantly other-dependent – is also true of adult self-regulation. But that is all the more reason to think that other-dependence and a well-functioning moral consciousness can go together. Moreover, since shame and guilt are one aspect of self-regulation, if other-dependence can be a characteristic generally of our well-functioning self-regulation – the ‘macro’ thesis – this supports the ‘micro’ thesis that other-dependence can characterize the well-functioning of both shame and guilt. The conclusion is that heteronomy lies not in the fact of other-dependence but in the nature of the dependence. |
| spellingShingle | Harcourt, E Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the 'Extended Mind' |
| title | Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the 'Extended Mind' |
| title_full | Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the 'Extended Mind' |
| title_fullStr | Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the 'Extended Mind' |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the 'Extended Mind' |
| title_short | Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the 'Extended Mind' |
| title_sort | moral emotion autonomy and the extended mind |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT harcourte moralemotionautonomyandtheextendedmind |