Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?

Abstract In this paper, I ask why Aristotle thinks that ethical virtue (rather than mere self-control) is required for practical wisdom. I argue that a satisfactory answer will need to explain why being prone to bad appetites implies a failing of the rational part of the soul. I go on to claim that...

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Main Author: Coope, U
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: 2012
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author Coope, U
author_facet Coope, U
author_sort Coope, U
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description Abstract In this paper, I ask why Aristotle thinks that ethical virtue (rather than mere self-control) is required for practical wisdom. I argue that a satisfactory answer will need to explain why being prone to bad appetites implies a failing of the rational part of the soul. I go on to claim that the self-controlled person does suffer from such a rational failing: a failure to take a specifically rational kind of pleasure in fine action. However, this still leaves a problem: could there not be someone who (unlike the self-controlled person) took the right kind of pleasure in fine action, but who failed to be virtuous on account of bad appetites? If so, would such a person be practically wise but not virtuous? I end with some suggestions about how Aristotle might answer this. © 2012 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden.
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spelling oxford-uuid:1ad47c78-75d7-4113-bc93-642d3626577b2022-03-26T10:56:58ZWhy does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:1ad47c78-75d7-4113-bc93-642d3626577bEnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2012Coope, UAbstract In this paper, I ask why Aristotle thinks that ethical virtue (rather than mere self-control) is required for practical wisdom. I argue that a satisfactory answer will need to explain why being prone to bad appetites implies a failing of the rational part of the soul. I go on to claim that the self-controlled person does suffer from such a rational failing: a failure to take a specifically rational kind of pleasure in fine action. However, this still leaves a problem: could there not be someone who (unlike the self-controlled person) took the right kind of pleasure in fine action, but who failed to be virtuous on account of bad appetites? If so, would such a person be practically wise but not virtuous? I end with some suggestions about how Aristotle might answer this. © 2012 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden.
spellingShingle Coope, U
Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?
title Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?
title_full Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?
title_fullStr Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?
title_full_unstemmed Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?
title_short Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?
title_sort why does aristotle think that ethical virtue is required for practical wisdom
work_keys_str_mv AT coopeu whydoesaristotlethinkthatethicalvirtueisrequiredforpracticalwisdom