Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a 'fictive pass' in understanding others' actions?
<p><strong>Introduction:</strong> The human capacity to engage with fictional worlds raises important psychological questions about the mechanisms that make this possible. Of particular interest is whether people respond differently to fictional stories compared to factual...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Frontiers Media
2023
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| _version_ | 1826310879436603392 |
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| author | Thompson, J Teasdale, B van Emde Boas, E Budelmann, F Duncan, S Maguire, L Dunbar, R |
| author_facet | Thompson, J Teasdale, B van Emde Boas, E Budelmann, F Duncan, S Maguire, L Dunbar, R |
| author_sort | Thompson, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p><strong>Introduction:</strong> The human capacity to engage with fictional worlds raises important psychological questions about the mechanisms that make this possible. Of particular interest is whether people respond differently to fictional stories compared to factual ones in terms of how immersed they become and how they view the characters involved and their actions. It has been suggested that fiction provides us with a ‘fictive pass’ that allows us to evaluate in a more balanced, detached way the morality of a character’s behaviour.</p>
<p><strong>Methods:</strong> We use a randomised controlled experimental design to test this.</p>
<p><strong>Results and discussion:</strong> We show that, although knowing whether a substantial film clip is fact or fiction does not affect how engaged with (‘transported’ by) a troubling story an observer becomes, it does grant them a ‘fictive pass’ to empathise with a moral transgressor. However, a fictive pass does not override the capacity to judge the causes of a character’s moral transgression (at least as indexed by a causal attribution task).</p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:00:01Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:1b5eb09d-0a3d-4c2d-948c-e82373d10575 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:00:01Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:1b5eb09d-0a3d-4c2d-948c-e82373d105752023-09-18T15:24:52ZDoes believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a 'fictive pass' in understanding others' actions?Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:1b5eb09d-0a3d-4c2d-948c-e82373d10575EnglishSymplectic ElementsFrontiers Media2023Thompson, JTeasdale, Bvan Emde Boas, EBudelmann, FDuncan, SMaguire, LDunbar, R<p><strong>Introduction:</strong> The human capacity to engage with fictional worlds raises important psychological questions about the mechanisms that make this possible. Of particular interest is whether people respond differently to fictional stories compared to factual ones in terms of how immersed they become and how they view the characters involved and their actions. It has been suggested that fiction provides us with a ‘fictive pass’ that allows us to evaluate in a more balanced, detached way the morality of a character’s behaviour.</p> <p><strong>Methods:</strong> We use a randomised controlled experimental design to test this.</p> <p><strong>Results and discussion:</strong> We show that, although knowing whether a substantial film clip is fact or fiction does not affect how engaged with (‘transported’ by) a troubling story an observer becomes, it does grant them a ‘fictive pass’ to empathise with a moral transgressor. However, a fictive pass does not override the capacity to judge the causes of a character’s moral transgression (at least as indexed by a causal attribution task).</p> |
| spellingShingle | Thompson, J Teasdale, B van Emde Boas, E Budelmann, F Duncan, S Maguire, L Dunbar, R Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a 'fictive pass' in understanding others' actions? |
| title | Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a 'fictive pass' in understanding others' actions? |
| title_full | Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a 'fictive pass' in understanding others' actions? |
| title_fullStr | Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a 'fictive pass' in understanding others' actions? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a 'fictive pass' in understanding others' actions? |
| title_short | Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a 'fictive pass' in understanding others' actions? |
| title_sort | does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a fictive pass in understanding others actions |
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