Rights and deprivation
<p>This thesis is concerned with rights-based justifications for redistribution. Orthodox views are critically examined in three of the chapters. The case against fundamental moral rights to welfare, not derived from other more fundamental moral rights or principles, is pressed in chapter thr...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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1990
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| _version_ | 1826315811831152640 |
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| author | Jacobs, L Jacobs, Lesley Alan Cerst |
| author_facet | Jacobs, L Jacobs, Lesley Alan Cerst |
| author_sort | Jacobs, L |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>This thesis is concerned with rights-based justifications for redistribution. Orthodox views are critically examined in three of the chapters. The case against fundamental moral rights to welfare, not derived from other more fundamental moral rights or principles, is pressed in chapter three. Chapter five distinguishes between rights-based and equality-based justifications for redistribution and argues that Ronald Dworkin's idea of a right to equal respect and concern is best understood as an equality-based justification. The enabling model of rights and deprivation is introduced in chapter six. This model says that liberty rights require that others ensure that the right-holder enjoys the means to do what he or she has the right to do as well as not interfere with him or her doing what he or she has the right to do. It is found to break down because it is unable to accommodate the right to do wrong. The other four chapters are concerned with defending an alternative model of rights and deprivation. The groundwork for this alternative model - the development model of rights and deprivation - is laid in chapters two and four. Chapter two presents a person-affecting theory of rights. The two principal conclusions of the development model of rights and deprivation are defended in chapter seven. It is argued, first, that from both of the abstract moral rights to liberty introduced in chapter four flow certain derivative rights against others to have one's needs met and, second, that the state is required to promote and protect particular forms of culture as well as to meet certain sorts of personal needs including special needs, collective needs, and the unmet personal needs that arise when the prevailing methods of meeting those needs breaks down. The final chapter discusses two general issues relating to the development model of rights and deprivation.</p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:25:33Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oxford-uuid:1b93ad00-6a14-4ab9-817f-c0a3f3960ffb |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-09T03:33:03Z |
| publishDate | 1990 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:1b93ad00-6a14-4ab9-817f-c0a3f3960ffb2024-12-01T16:12:04ZRights and deprivationThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06uuid:1b93ad00-6a14-4ab9-817f-c0a3f3960ffbWelfare stateDistributive justiceWelfare rights movementEconomic securityEnglishPolonsky Theses Digitisation Project1990Jacobs, LJacobs, Lesley Alan Cerst<p>This thesis is concerned with rights-based justifications for redistribution. Orthodox views are critically examined in three of the chapters. The case against fundamental moral rights to welfare, not derived from other more fundamental moral rights or principles, is pressed in chapter three. Chapter five distinguishes between rights-based and equality-based justifications for redistribution and argues that Ronald Dworkin's idea of a right to equal respect and concern is best understood as an equality-based justification. The enabling model of rights and deprivation is introduced in chapter six. This model says that liberty rights require that others ensure that the right-holder enjoys the means to do what he or she has the right to do as well as not interfere with him or her doing what he or she has the right to do. It is found to break down because it is unable to accommodate the right to do wrong. The other four chapters are concerned with defending an alternative model of rights and deprivation. The groundwork for this alternative model - the development model of rights and deprivation - is laid in chapters two and four. Chapter two presents a person-affecting theory of rights. The two principal conclusions of the development model of rights and deprivation are defended in chapter seven. It is argued, first, that from both of the abstract moral rights to liberty introduced in chapter four flow certain derivative rights against others to have one's needs met and, second, that the state is required to promote and protect particular forms of culture as well as to meet certain sorts of personal needs including special needs, collective needs, and the unmet personal needs that arise when the prevailing methods of meeting those needs breaks down. The final chapter discusses two general issues relating to the development model of rights and deprivation.</p> |
| spellingShingle | Welfare state Distributive justice Welfare rights movement Economic security Jacobs, L Jacobs, Lesley Alan Cerst Rights and deprivation |
| title | Rights and deprivation |
| title_full | Rights and deprivation |
| title_fullStr | Rights and deprivation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rights and deprivation |
| title_short | Rights and deprivation |
| title_sort | rights and deprivation |
| topic | Welfare state Distributive justice Welfare rights movement Economic security |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jacobsl rightsanddeprivation AT jacobslesleyalancerst rightsanddeprivation |