Military Expenditure: Threats, Aid, and Arms Races.

Using global data for the period 1960-99, Collier and Hoeffler estimate neighborhood arms races. They find that the level of military expenditure is strongly influenced by the expenditure of neighbors. The authors estimate an 'arms race multiplier,' finding that an initial exogenous increa...

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Main Authors: Collier, P, Hoeffler, A
Format: Working paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank 2002
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author Collier, P
Hoeffler, A
author_facet Collier, P
Hoeffler, A
author_sort Collier, P
collection OXFORD
description Using global data for the period 1960-99, Collier and Hoeffler estimate neighborhood arms races. They find that the level of military expenditure is strongly influenced by the expenditure of neighbors. The authors estimate an 'arms race multiplier,' finding that an initial exogenous increase in military expenditure by one country is more than doubled in both the originating country and its neighbor. An implication is that military expenditure is, to an extent, a 'regional public bad.' Potentially, there is an offsetting public good effect if rebellions are deterred by military expenditure. However, instrumenting for military expenditure, the authors find no deterrence effect of military spending on the risk of internal conflict. So there appears to be no regional public good effect offsetting the public bad arising from a neighborhood arms race. This paper--a product of the Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to study the economics of conflict.
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spelling oxford-uuid:1c5e7f8f-154f-4f3a-b08b-5151d8717fc32022-03-26T11:05:13ZMilitary Expenditure: Threats, Aid, and Arms Races.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:1c5e7f8f-154f-4f3a-b08b-5151d8717fc3EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsWorld Bank2002Collier, PHoeffler, AUsing global data for the period 1960-99, Collier and Hoeffler estimate neighborhood arms races. They find that the level of military expenditure is strongly influenced by the expenditure of neighbors. The authors estimate an 'arms race multiplier,' finding that an initial exogenous increase in military expenditure by one country is more than doubled in both the originating country and its neighbor. An implication is that military expenditure is, to an extent, a 'regional public bad.' Potentially, there is an offsetting public good effect if rebellions are deterred by military expenditure. However, instrumenting for military expenditure, the authors find no deterrence effect of military spending on the risk of internal conflict. So there appears to be no regional public good effect offsetting the public bad arising from a neighborhood arms race. This paper--a product of the Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to study the economics of conflict.
spellingShingle Collier, P
Hoeffler, A
Military Expenditure: Threats, Aid, and Arms Races.
title Military Expenditure: Threats, Aid, and Arms Races.
title_full Military Expenditure: Threats, Aid, and Arms Races.
title_fullStr Military Expenditure: Threats, Aid, and Arms Races.
title_full_unstemmed Military Expenditure: Threats, Aid, and Arms Races.
title_short Military Expenditure: Threats, Aid, and Arms Races.
title_sort military expenditure threats aid and arms races
work_keys_str_mv AT collierp militaryexpenditurethreatsaidandarmsraces
AT hoefflera militaryexpenditurethreatsaidandarmsraces