Patterns of competition with captive customers
We study mixed-strategy equilibrium pricing in oligopoly settings where con-sumers vary in the set of suppliers they consider for their purchase-some being captive to a particular firm, some consider two particular firms, and so on. In the case of "nested reach" we find equilibria, unlike...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2018
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| _version_ | 1797056958163845120 |
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| author | Armstrong, M Vickers, J |
| author_facet | Armstrong, M Vickers, J |
| author_sort | Armstrong, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We study mixed-strategy equilibrium pricing in oligopoly settings where con-sumers vary in the set of suppliers they consider for their purchase-some being captive to a particular firm, some consider two particular firms, and so on. In the case of "nested reach" we find equilibria, unlike those in more standard models, in which firms are ranked in terms of the prices they might charge. We character-ize equilibria in the three-firm case, and contrast them with equilibria in the parallel model with capacity constraints. A theme of the analysis is how patterns of consumer interaction with firms matter for competitive outcomes. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:29:50Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:1d14aaa4-428b-4095-8dc5-af2c7562683a |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:29:50Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | University of Oxford |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:1d14aaa4-428b-4095-8dc5-af2c7562683a2022-03-26T11:08:56ZPatterns of competition with captive customersWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:1d14aaa4-428b-4095-8dc5-af2c7562683aBulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2018Armstrong, MVickers, JWe study mixed-strategy equilibrium pricing in oligopoly settings where con-sumers vary in the set of suppliers they consider for their purchase-some being captive to a particular firm, some consider two particular firms, and so on. In the case of "nested reach" we find equilibria, unlike those in more standard models, in which firms are ranked in terms of the prices they might charge. We character-ize equilibria in the three-firm case, and contrast them with equilibria in the parallel model with capacity constraints. A theme of the analysis is how patterns of consumer interaction with firms matter for competitive outcomes. |
| spellingShingle | Armstrong, M Vickers, J Patterns of competition with captive customers |
| title | Patterns of competition with captive customers |
| title_full | Patterns of competition with captive customers |
| title_fullStr | Patterns of competition with captive customers |
| title_full_unstemmed | Patterns of competition with captive customers |
| title_short | Patterns of competition with captive customers |
| title_sort | patterns of competition with captive customers |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT armstrongm patternsofcompetitionwithcaptivecustomers AT vickersj patternsofcompetitionwithcaptivecustomers |