Environmental regulation by private contest

It is widely expected that the recent trend (in the USA, EU and elsewhere) towards an increased role for private agents and agencies in the formulation and enforcement of environmental regulation will continue. If environmental regulation is to be "privatized" in this way it is natural to...

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Main Author: Heyes, A
Format: Working paper
Language:English
Published: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 1995
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author Heyes, A
author_facet Heyes, A
author_sort Heyes, A
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description It is widely expected that the recent trend (in the USA, EU and elsewhere) towards an increased role for private agents and agencies in the formulation and enforcement of environmental regulation will continue. If environmental regulation is to be "privatized" in this way it is natural to ask how far the activities of environmental groups, on whose shoulders much of the responsibility for defending the environment is likely to fall, should be subsidized or taxed. In this paper we identify the trade-offs involved and characterize the optimal subsidy/tax. The analysis is argued to have significant implications for how governments should think about the way in which fiscal law treats environmental NGOs.
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spelling oxford-uuid:1d3f8fe2-0959-498d-b17b-b5f1a7322a952022-03-26T11:09:49ZEnvironmental regulation by private contestWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:1d3f8fe2-0959-498d-b17b-b5f1a7322a95EnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetOxford Institute for Energy Studies1995Heyes, AIt is widely expected that the recent trend (in the USA, EU and elsewhere) towards an increased role for private agents and agencies in the formulation and enforcement of environmental regulation will continue. If environmental regulation is to be "privatized" in this way it is natural to ask how far the activities of environmental groups, on whose shoulders much of the responsibility for defending the environment is likely to fall, should be subsidized or taxed. In this paper we identify the trade-offs involved and characterize the optimal subsidy/tax. The analysis is argued to have significant implications for how governments should think about the way in which fiscal law treats environmental NGOs.
spellingShingle Heyes, A
Environmental regulation by private contest
title Environmental regulation by private contest
title_full Environmental regulation by private contest
title_fullStr Environmental regulation by private contest
title_full_unstemmed Environmental regulation by private contest
title_short Environmental regulation by private contest
title_sort environmental regulation by private contest
work_keys_str_mv AT heyesa environmentalregulationbyprivatecontest