Network Interconnection in Telecommunications
This paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service. Two scenarios are considered: (i) the case of a symmetric, unregulated industry, and (ii) the case of an industry with a dom...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Blackwell Publishers
1998
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| _version_ | 1797057134616117248 |
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| author | Armstrong, M |
| author_facet | Armstrong, M |
| author_sort | Armstrong, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service. Two scenarios are considered: (i) the case of a symmetric, unregulated industry, and (ii) the case of an industry with a dominant, regulated incumbent. In the first, provided there is sufficient product differentiation, it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit-maximising outcome. In the second a formula for the welfare-maximizing interconnection charge is derived. Relations with the 'efficient component pricing rule' are discussed. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:31:59Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:1dc5724e-45cc-4b17-bd67-0bc1ac06e2a3 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:31:59Z |
| publishDate | 1998 |
| publisher | Blackwell Publishers |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:1dc5724e-45cc-4b17-bd67-0bc1ac06e2a32022-03-26T11:12:43ZNetwork Interconnection in TelecommunicationsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:1dc5724e-45cc-4b17-bd67-0bc1ac06e2a3EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsBlackwell Publishers1998Armstrong, MThis paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service. Two scenarios are considered: (i) the case of a symmetric, unregulated industry, and (ii) the case of an industry with a dominant, regulated incumbent. In the first, provided there is sufficient product differentiation, it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit-maximising outcome. In the second a formula for the welfare-maximizing interconnection charge is derived. Relations with the 'efficient component pricing rule' are discussed. |
| spellingShingle | Armstrong, M Network Interconnection in Telecommunications |
| title | Network Interconnection in Telecommunications |
| title_full | Network Interconnection in Telecommunications |
| title_fullStr | Network Interconnection in Telecommunications |
| title_full_unstemmed | Network Interconnection in Telecommunications |
| title_short | Network Interconnection in Telecommunications |
| title_sort | network interconnection in telecommunications |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT armstrongm networkinterconnectionintelecommunications |