Substance dualism
Events are the instantiations of properties in substances at times. A full history of the world must include, as well as physical events, mental events (ones to which the substance involved has privileged access) and mental substances (ones to the existence of which the substance has privileged acce...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Philosophy Documentation Center
2009
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| _version_ | 1826310980052713472 |
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| author | Swinburne, R |
| author_facet | Swinburne, R |
| author_sort | Swinburne, R |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Events are the instantiations of properties in substances at times. A full history of the world must include, as well as physical events, mental events (ones to which the substance involved has privileged access) and mental substances (ones to the existence of which the substance has privileged access), and, among the latter, pure mental substances (ones which do not include a physical substance as an essential part). Humans are pure mental substances. An argument for this is that it seems conceivable that I could exist without my body. An objection to this argument is that ‘I’ refers to my body, and so what seems conceivable is not metaphysically possible. My response to this objection is that ‘I’ is an informative designator and so necessarily we know to what it refers, and it does not refer to my body. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:01:36Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:1e3df12d-d503-4a95-9549-de4c0a83e1eb |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:01:36Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:1e3df12d-d503-4a95-9549-de4c0a83e1eb2023-10-09T11:06:55ZSubstance dualismJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:1e3df12d-d503-4a95-9549-de4c0a83e1ebEnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordPhilosophy Documentation Center2009Swinburne, REvents are the instantiations of properties in substances at times. A full history of the world must include, as well as physical events, mental events (ones to which the substance involved has privileged access) and mental substances (ones to the existence of which the substance has privileged access), and, among the latter, pure mental substances (ones which do not include a physical substance as an essential part). Humans are pure mental substances. An argument for this is that it seems conceivable that I could exist without my body. An objection to this argument is that ‘I’ refers to my body, and so what seems conceivable is not metaphysically possible. My response to this objection is that ‘I’ is an informative designator and so necessarily we know to what it refers, and it does not refer to my body. |
| spellingShingle | Swinburne, R Substance dualism |
| title | Substance dualism |
| title_full | Substance dualism |
| title_fullStr | Substance dualism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Substance dualism |
| title_short | Substance dualism |
| title_sort | substance dualism |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT swinburner substancedualism |