A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, “Toxic Asset” Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions.
I describe a new static (sealed-bid) auction for differentiated goods—the “Product-Mix Auction”. Bidders bid on multiple assets simultaneously, and bidtakers choose supply functions across assets. The auction yields greater efficiency, revenue, information, and trade than running multiple separate a...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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MIT Press
2010
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| _version_ | 1826262307718561792 |
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| author | Klemperer, P |
| author_facet | Klemperer, P |
| author_sort | Klemperer, P |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | I describe a new static (sealed-bid) auction for differentiated goods—the “Product-Mix Auction”. Bidders bid on multiple assets simultaneously, and bidtakers choose supply functions across assets. The auction yields greater efficiency, revenue, information, and trade than running multiple separate auctions. It is also often simpler to use and understand, and less vulnerable to collusion, than a simultaneous multiple round auction. I designed it after the 2007 Northern Rock bank-run to help the Bank of England fight the credit crunch; in 2008 the U.S. Treasury planned using a related design to buy “toxic assets”; it may be used to purchase electricity. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:34:20Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:1e88f548-dfd4-40e6-a9b8-2a708342a99c |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:34:20Z |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:1e88f548-dfd4-40e6-a9b8-2a708342a99c2022-03-26T11:16:52ZA New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, “Toxic Asset” Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:1e88f548-dfd4-40e6-a9b8-2a708342a99cEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsMIT Press2010Klemperer, PI describe a new static (sealed-bid) auction for differentiated goods—the “Product-Mix Auction”. Bidders bid on multiple assets simultaneously, and bidtakers choose supply functions across assets. The auction yields greater efficiency, revenue, information, and trade than running multiple separate auctions. It is also often simpler to use and understand, and less vulnerable to collusion, than a simultaneous multiple round auction. I designed it after the 2007 Northern Rock bank-run to help the Bank of England fight the credit crunch; in 2008 the U.S. Treasury planned using a related design to buy “toxic assets”; it may be used to purchase electricity. |
| spellingShingle | Klemperer, P A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, “Toxic Asset” Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions. |
| title | A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, “Toxic Asset” Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions. |
| title_full | A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, “Toxic Asset” Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions. |
| title_fullStr | A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, “Toxic Asset” Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions. |
| title_full_unstemmed | A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, “Toxic Asset” Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions. |
| title_short | A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, “Toxic Asset” Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions. |
| title_sort | new auction for substitutes central bank liquidity auctions toxic asset auctions and variable product mix auctions |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT klempererp anewauctionforsubstitutescentralbankliquidityauctionstoxicassetauctionsandvariableproductmixauctions AT klempererp newauctionforsubstitutescentralbankliquidityauctionstoxicassetauctionsandvariableproductmixauctions |