The application of divine commands

Divine commands are typically held, by theists, to be made not only at the foundations of morality, but also in an 'everyday' setting, when there are already moral considerations applicable to the addressee(s). My aim is to show how a particular command could relate to these pre-existing m...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Shaw, J
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press 1999
Subjects:
_version_ 1826262313454272512
author Shaw, J
author_facet Shaw, J
author_sort Shaw, J
collection OXFORD
description Divine commands are typically held, by theists, to be made not only at the foundations of morality, but also in an 'everyday' setting, when there are already moral considerations applicable to the addressee(s). My aim is to show how a particular command could relate to these pre-existing moral considerations, if it is more than just a repetition of them. If it is right that an action be obligatory, wrong or supererogatory, why would God want to change its status? Anyone can make a normative difference by giving information, making co-ordination proposals, or transferring rights, and it is clear why these actions will sometimes be worthwhile. The problem must be focused on when God makes a moral difference directly, using a 'special moral authority', when His commands are efficacious qua commands. Using this authority, God can perfect imperfect duties, which may make it easier to carry them out. He can extend duties, to make sure more value is produced. He can allocate sacrifices, which can be carried out by anyone. And He can resolve conflict games, to everyone's benefit. This explains why God should issue commands in the way that theists typically represent him as doing.
first_indexed 2024-03-06T19:34:27Z
format Journal article
id oxford-uuid:1e914af6-2fc0-4313-ade4-c3cd5de3294e
institution University of Oxford
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-06T19:34:27Z
publishDate 1999
publisher Cambridge University Press
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:1e914af6-2fc0-4313-ade4-c3cd5de3294e2022-03-26T11:17:05ZThe application of divine commandsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:1e914af6-2fc0-4313-ade4-c3cd5de3294ePhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetCambridge University Press1999Shaw, JDivine commands are typically held, by theists, to be made not only at the foundations of morality, but also in an 'everyday' setting, when there are already moral considerations applicable to the addressee(s). My aim is to show how a particular command could relate to these pre-existing moral considerations, if it is more than just a repetition of them. If it is right that an action be obligatory, wrong or supererogatory, why would God want to change its status? Anyone can make a normative difference by giving information, making co-ordination proposals, or transferring rights, and it is clear why these actions will sometimes be worthwhile. The problem must be focused on when God makes a moral difference directly, using a 'special moral authority', when His commands are efficacious qua commands. Using this authority, God can perfect imperfect duties, which may make it easier to carry them out. He can extend duties, to make sure more value is produced. He can allocate sacrifices, which can be carried out by anyone. And He can resolve conflict games, to everyone's benefit. This explains why God should issue commands in the way that theists typically represent him as doing.
spellingShingle Philosophy
Shaw, J
The application of divine commands
title The application of divine commands
title_full The application of divine commands
title_fullStr The application of divine commands
title_full_unstemmed The application of divine commands
title_short The application of divine commands
title_sort application of divine commands
topic Philosophy
work_keys_str_mv AT shawj theapplicationofdivinecommands
AT shawj applicationofdivinecommands