Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes
If criminal law blamed in a way that accurately reflected blameworthiness, what would it say about the outcomes of our actions? On one view, criminal law would be outcome-insensitive: all crimes would be defined in the inchoate mode, and outcomes would be irrelevant to the quantum of punishment. On...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
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Oxford University Press
2018
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author | Edwards, J Simester, A |
author_facet | Edwards, J Simester, A |
author_sort | Edwards, J |
collection | OXFORD |
description | If criminal law blamed in a way that accurately reflected blameworthiness, what would it say about the outcomes of our actions? On one view, criminal law would be outcome-insensitive: all crimes would be defined in the inchoate mode, and outcomes would be irrelevant to the quantum of punishment. On a second view, criminal law would be doubly outcome-sensitive: some crimes would be defined in terms of outcomes, and more punishment would be imposed where those outcomes occurred. Here, we reject both of these views in favour of a third. While the outcomes of our actions affect which wrongs we commit, they do not make us more blameworthy for committing them. A criminal law that accurately reflected blameworthiness would convict those who commit significantly different wrongs of different crimes. It would punish those who are equally blameworthy to the same degree. So the outcomes of our actions would be relevant to criminalisation. But they would be irrelevant to the quantum of punishment imposed. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:36:39Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:1f480a43-3e7a-4fc6-8415-44e508e7ac70 |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:36:39Z |
publishDate | 2018 |
publisher | Oxford University Press |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:1f480a43-3e7a-4fc6-8415-44e508e7ac702022-03-26T11:20:58ZCrime, blameworthiness, and outcomesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:1f480a43-3e7a-4fc6-8415-44e508e7ac70EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2018Edwards, JSimester, AIf criminal law blamed in a way that accurately reflected blameworthiness, what would it say about the outcomes of our actions? On one view, criminal law would be outcome-insensitive: all crimes would be defined in the inchoate mode, and outcomes would be irrelevant to the quantum of punishment. On a second view, criminal law would be doubly outcome-sensitive: some crimes would be defined in terms of outcomes, and more punishment would be imposed where those outcomes occurred. Here, we reject both of these views in favour of a third. While the outcomes of our actions affect which wrongs we commit, they do not make us more blameworthy for committing them. A criminal law that accurately reflected blameworthiness would convict those who commit significantly different wrongs of different crimes. It would punish those who are equally blameworthy to the same degree. So the outcomes of our actions would be relevant to criminalisation. But they would be irrelevant to the quantum of punishment imposed. |
spellingShingle | Edwards, J Simester, A Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes |
title | Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes |
title_full | Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes |
title_fullStr | Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes |
title_full_unstemmed | Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes |
title_short | Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes |
title_sort | crime blameworthiness and outcomes |
work_keys_str_mv | AT edwardsj crimeblameworthinessandoutcomes AT simestera crimeblameworthinessandoutcomes |