Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes

If criminal law blamed in a way that accurately reflected blameworthiness, what would it say about the outcomes of our actions? On one view, criminal law would be outcome-insensitive: all crimes would be defined in the inchoate mode, and outcomes would be irrelevant to the quantum of punishment. On...

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Main Authors: Edwards, J, Simester, A
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Oxford University Press 2018
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author Edwards, J
Simester, A
author_facet Edwards, J
Simester, A
author_sort Edwards, J
collection OXFORD
description If criminal law blamed in a way that accurately reflected blameworthiness, what would it say about the outcomes of our actions? On one view, criminal law would be outcome-insensitive: all crimes would be defined in the inchoate mode, and outcomes would be irrelevant to the quantum of punishment. On a second view, criminal law would be doubly outcome-sensitive: some crimes would be defined in terms of outcomes, and more punishment would be imposed where those outcomes occurred. Here, we reject both of these views in favour of a third. While the outcomes of our actions affect which wrongs we commit, they do not make us more blameworthy for committing them. A criminal law that accurately reflected blameworthiness would convict those who commit significantly different wrongs of different crimes. It would punish those who are equally blameworthy to the same degree. So the outcomes of our actions would be relevant to criminalisation. But they would be irrelevant to the quantum of punishment imposed.
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spelling oxford-uuid:1f480a43-3e7a-4fc6-8415-44e508e7ac702022-03-26T11:20:58ZCrime, blameworthiness, and outcomesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:1f480a43-3e7a-4fc6-8415-44e508e7ac70EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2018Edwards, JSimester, AIf criminal law blamed in a way that accurately reflected blameworthiness, what would it say about the outcomes of our actions? On one view, criminal law would be outcome-insensitive: all crimes would be defined in the inchoate mode, and outcomes would be irrelevant to the quantum of punishment. On a second view, criminal law would be doubly outcome-sensitive: some crimes would be defined in terms of outcomes, and more punishment would be imposed where those outcomes occurred. Here, we reject both of these views in favour of a third. While the outcomes of our actions affect which wrongs we commit, they do not make us more blameworthy for committing them. A criminal law that accurately reflected blameworthiness would convict those who commit significantly different wrongs of different crimes. It would punish those who are equally blameworthy to the same degree. So the outcomes of our actions would be relevant to criminalisation. But they would be irrelevant to the quantum of punishment imposed.
spellingShingle Edwards, J
Simester, A
Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes
title Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes
title_full Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes
title_fullStr Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes
title_full_unstemmed Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes
title_short Crime, blameworthiness, and outcomes
title_sort crime blameworthiness and outcomes
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