Public Sector Motivation and Development Failures.

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the relationship between public sector motivation and development. In the model the public sector produces a public good and workers are heterogeneous in terms of public sector motivation (PSM). Wages in the private sector increase with the quality of th...

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Main Author: Macchiavello, R
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2008
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author Macchiavello, R
author_facet Macchiavello, R
author_sort Macchiavello, R
collection OXFORD
description This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the relationship between public sector motivation and development. In the model the public sector produces a public good and workers are heterogeneous in terms of public sector motivation (PSM). Wages in the private sector increase with the quality of the public good. In this context, public sector wage premia (PSWP) have two opposite effects: low PSWP helps screen workers with PSM into the public sector, while high PSWP helps motivate workers to be honest. Raising PSWP may not improve the quality of governance and multiple equilibria might arise. The model highlights that the relative importance of workers selection and provision of "on the job" incentives in the public sector varies in systematic ways with wages in the private sector. We provide anecdotal and original empirical evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions and discuss some policy implications for public sector reforms in developing countries.
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spelling oxford-uuid:204c0291-3abf-4a1f-9530-947bef8177972022-03-26T11:26:49ZPublic Sector Motivation and Development Failures.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:204c0291-3abf-4a1f-9530-947bef817797EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsElsevier2008Macchiavello, RThis paper provides a theoretical analysis of the relationship between public sector motivation and development. In the model the public sector produces a public good and workers are heterogeneous in terms of public sector motivation (PSM). Wages in the private sector increase with the quality of the public good. In this context, public sector wage premia (PSWP) have two opposite effects: low PSWP helps screen workers with PSM into the public sector, while high PSWP helps motivate workers to be honest. Raising PSWP may not improve the quality of governance and multiple equilibria might arise. The model highlights that the relative importance of workers selection and provision of "on the job" incentives in the public sector varies in systematic ways with wages in the private sector. We provide anecdotal and original empirical evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions and discuss some policy implications for public sector reforms in developing countries.
spellingShingle Macchiavello, R
Public Sector Motivation and Development Failures.
title Public Sector Motivation and Development Failures.
title_full Public Sector Motivation and Development Failures.
title_fullStr Public Sector Motivation and Development Failures.
title_full_unstemmed Public Sector Motivation and Development Failures.
title_short Public Sector Motivation and Development Failures.
title_sort public sector motivation and development failures
work_keys_str_mv AT macchiavellor publicsectormotivationanddevelopmentfailures