Are propositional attitudes mental states?
I present an argument that propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states, then only minded beings could have them; but there are reasons to think that some non-minded beings could bear propositional attitudes. To illus...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer
2022
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| _version_ | 1826308535936352256 |
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| author | Baysan, U |
| author_facet | Baysan, U |
| author_sort | Baysan, U |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | I present an argument that propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states, then only minded beings could have them; but there are reasons to think that some non-minded beings could bear propositional attitudes. To illustrate this, I appeal to cases of genuine group intentionality. I argue that these are cases in which some group entities bear propositional attitudes, but they are not subjects of mental states. Although propositional attitudes are not mental states, I propose that they are typically co-instantiated with mental states. In an attempt to explain this co-instantiation, I suggest that propositional attitudes of minded beings are typically realized by mental states.
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| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:19:22Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:20ebca24-7918-4b58-b7cc-a850ba84873a |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:19:22Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:20ebca24-7918-4b58-b7cc-a850ba84873a2022-10-06T08:50:36ZAre propositional attitudes mental states?Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:20ebca24-7918-4b58-b7cc-a850ba84873aEnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer2022Baysan, UI present an argument that propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states, then only minded beings could have them; but there are reasons to think that some non-minded beings could bear propositional attitudes. To illustrate this, I appeal to cases of genuine group intentionality. I argue that these are cases in which some group entities bear propositional attitudes, but they are not subjects of mental states. Although propositional attitudes are not mental states, I propose that they are typically co-instantiated with mental states. In an attempt to explain this co-instantiation, I suggest that propositional attitudes of minded beings are typically realized by mental states. |
| spellingShingle | Baysan, U Are propositional attitudes mental states? |
| title | Are propositional attitudes mental states? |
| title_full | Are propositional attitudes mental states? |
| title_fullStr | Are propositional attitudes mental states? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Are propositional attitudes mental states? |
| title_short | Are propositional attitudes mental states? |
| title_sort | are propositional attitudes mental states |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT baysanu arepropositionalattitudesmentalstates |