Wittgenstein and phenomenal concepts
Many philosophers think that there are phenomenal concepts: distinctive ways of thinking of experiences or sensations that can be grasped only by those who know what it is like to have those experiences or sensations. What light does Wittgenstein’s philosophy throw on this idea? In the literature, p...
Prif Awdur: | Child, T |
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Fformat: | Book section |
Cyhoeddwyd: |
Routledge
2015
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Eitemau Tebyg
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What We Can Learn about Phenomenal Concepts from Wittgenstein’s Private Language
gan: Roberto Sá Pereira
Cyhoeddwyd: (2016-11-01) -
Wittgenstein, seeing-as, and novelty
gan: Child, T
Cyhoeddwyd: (2018) -
Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts
gan: André Joffily Abath
Cyhoeddwyd: (2010-05-01) -
Phenomenal Knowledge without Phenomenal Concepts? On Jesse Prinz’ Theory of Mental Pointers
gan: Barberis, Sergio Daniel
Cyhoeddwyd: (2011-05-01) -
Wittgenstein, scientism and anti-scientism in the philosophy of mind
gan: Child, T
Cyhoeddwyd: (2017)