Wittgenstein and phenomenal concepts
Many philosophers think that there are phenomenal concepts: distinctive ways of thinking of experiences or sensations that can be grasped only by those who know what it is like to have those experiences or sensations. What light does Wittgenstein’s philosophy throw on this idea? In the literature, p...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | Child, T |
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Μορφή: | Book section |
Έκδοση: |
Routledge
2015
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Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
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