Wittgenstein and phenomenal concepts
Many philosophers think that there are phenomenal concepts: distinctive ways of thinking of experiences or sensations that can be grasped only by those who know what it is like to have those experiences or sensations. What light does Wittgenstein’s philosophy throw on this idea? In the literature, p...
Príomhchruthaitheoir: | Child, T |
---|---|
Formáid: | Book section |
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
Routledge
2015
|
Míreanna comhchosúla
-
What We Can Learn about Phenomenal Concepts from Wittgenstein’s Private Language
de réir: Roberto Sá Pereira
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: (2016-11-01) -
Wittgenstein, seeing-as, and novelty
de réir: Child, T
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: (2018) -
Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts
de réir: André Joffily Abath
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: (2010-05-01) -
Phenomenal Knowledge without Phenomenal Concepts? On Jesse Prinz’ Theory of Mental Pointers
de réir: Barberis, Sergio Daniel
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: (2011-05-01) -
Wittgenstein, scientism and anti-scientism in the philosophy of mind
de réir: Child, T
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: (2017)