Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
We study evolutionary dynamics in assignment games where many agents interact anonymously at virtually no cost. The process is decentralized, very little information is available and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a completely uncoupled learning process that...
Main Authors: | Nax, H, Pradelski, B |
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Format: | Working paper |
Published: |
University of Oxford
2012
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