Learning with fixed rules: the minority game

This paper gives a critical account of the literature on adaptive behaviour in the minority game, a simple congestion game. The literature has proposed a model which differs markedly from many standard learning models in that players are endowed with a fixed subset of behavioural rules or response m...

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Main Author: Kets, W
Format: Journal article
Published: Wiley 2011
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author Kets, W
author_facet Kets, W
author_sort Kets, W
collection OXFORD
description This paper gives a critical account of the literature on adaptive behaviour in the minority game, a simple congestion game. The literature has proposed a model which differs markedly from many standard learning models in that players are endowed with a fixed subset of behavioural rules or response modes which map the observed history to actions. These rules need not have a behavioural interpretation or be derived from some form of optimizing behaviour. Nonetheless, this model gives rise to behaviour that is close to equilibrium behaviour at the aggregate level. The individual‐level behaviour predicted by the model seems to capture some aspects of observed experimental behaviour that are difficult to explain using standard models.
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spelling oxford-uuid:2404e1d6-d31e-4af3-93d4-b3afc34601142022-03-26T11:47:34ZLearning with fixed rules: the minority gameJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:2404e1d6-d31e-4af3-93d4-b3afc3460114Symplectic Elements at OxfordWiley2011Kets, WThis paper gives a critical account of the literature on adaptive behaviour in the minority game, a simple congestion game. The literature has proposed a model which differs markedly from many standard learning models in that players are endowed with a fixed subset of behavioural rules or response modes which map the observed history to actions. These rules need not have a behavioural interpretation or be derived from some form of optimizing behaviour. Nonetheless, this model gives rise to behaviour that is close to equilibrium behaviour at the aggregate level. The individual‐level behaviour predicted by the model seems to capture some aspects of observed experimental behaviour that are difficult to explain using standard models.
spellingShingle Kets, W
Learning with fixed rules: the minority game
title Learning with fixed rules: the minority game
title_full Learning with fixed rules: the minority game
title_fullStr Learning with fixed rules: the minority game
title_full_unstemmed Learning with fixed rules: the minority game
title_short Learning with fixed rules: the minority game
title_sort learning with fixed rules the minority game
work_keys_str_mv AT ketsw learningwithfixedrulestheminoritygame