What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist?
This paper addresses the question of how to distinguish moral realism from moral anti-realism. An influential view, prevalent primarily due to the work of Michael Dummett, appeals to semantic features of realism such as truth, bivalence, and surface form. However, minimalist accounts enable an anti-...
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Aineistotyyppi: | Opinnäyte |
Kieli: | English |
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2013
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author | Clark, W William Clark |
author2 | Parsons, J |
author_facet | Parsons, J Clark, W William Clark |
author_sort | Clark, W |
collection | OXFORD |
description | This paper addresses the question of how to distinguish moral realism from moral anti-realism. An influential view, prevalent primarily due to the work of Michael Dummett, appeals to semantic features of realism such as truth, bivalence, and surface form. However, minimalist accounts enable an anti-realist to appropriate any such semantic feature. The semantic characterisation is thus unable to distinguish adequately between moral realists and moral anti-realists. This is the problem of Creeping Minimalism. An alternative characterisation of the debate is proposed, making use of the distinctively metaphysical criteria of ontological inclusion/exclusion. Semantic minimalism is not an issue here, and the possibility of minimalism about ontology is shown to be incompatible with both realism and anti-realism, thus preventing the recurrence of Creeping Minimalism. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:52:51Z |
format | Thesis |
id | oxford-uuid:248d2c20-261c-4fcf-8c0b-1de74822812f |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:52:51Z |
publishDate | 2013 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:248d2c20-261c-4fcf-8c0b-1de74822812f2022-03-26T11:50:39ZWhat is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist?Thesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdccuuid:248d2c20-261c-4fcf-8c0b-1de74822812fModern Western philosophyPhilosophyEthics (Moral philosophy)EnglishOxford University Research Archive - Valet2013Clark, WWilliam ClarkParsons, JThis paper addresses the question of how to distinguish moral realism from moral anti-realism. An influential view, prevalent primarily due to the work of Michael Dummett, appeals to semantic features of realism such as truth, bivalence, and surface form. However, minimalist accounts enable an anti-realist to appropriate any such semantic feature. The semantic characterisation is thus unable to distinguish adequately between moral realists and moral anti-realists. This is the problem of Creeping Minimalism. An alternative characterisation of the debate is proposed, making use of the distinctively metaphysical criteria of ontological inclusion/exclusion. Semantic minimalism is not an issue here, and the possibility of minimalism about ontology is shown to be incompatible with both realism and anti-realism, thus preventing the recurrence of Creeping Minimalism. |
spellingShingle | Modern Western philosophy Philosophy Ethics (Moral philosophy) Clark, W William Clark What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist? |
title | What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist? |
title_full | What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist? |
title_fullStr | What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist? |
title_full_unstemmed | What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist? |
title_short | What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist? |
title_sort | what is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti realist |
topic | Modern Western philosophy Philosophy Ethics (Moral philosophy) |
work_keys_str_mv | AT clarkw whatisthedifferencebetweenamoralrealistandamoralantirealist AT williamclark whatisthedifferencebetweenamoralrealistandamoralantirealist |