What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist?

This paper addresses the question of how to distinguish moral realism from moral anti-realism. An influential view, prevalent primarily due to the work of Michael Dummett, appeals to semantic features of realism such as truth, bivalence, and surface form. However, minimalist accounts enable an anti-...

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Päätekijät: Clark, W, William Clark
Muut tekijät: Parsons, J
Aineistotyyppi: Opinnäyte
Kieli:English
Julkaistu: 2013
Aiheet:
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author Clark, W
William Clark
author2 Parsons, J
author_facet Parsons, J
Clark, W
William Clark
author_sort Clark, W
collection OXFORD
description This paper addresses the question of how to distinguish moral realism from moral anti-realism. An influential view, prevalent primarily due to the work of Michael Dummett, appeals to semantic features of realism such as truth, bivalence, and surface form. However, minimalist accounts enable an anti-realist to appropriate any such semantic feature. The semantic characterisation is thus unable to distinguish adequately between moral realists and moral anti-realists. This is the problem of Creeping Minimalism. An alternative characterisation of the debate is proposed, making use of the distinctively metaphysical criteria of ontological inclusion/exclusion. Semantic minimalism is not an issue here, and the possibility of minimalism about ontology is shown to be incompatible with both realism and anti-realism, thus preventing the recurrence of Creeping Minimalism.
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spelling oxford-uuid:248d2c20-261c-4fcf-8c0b-1de74822812f2022-03-26T11:50:39ZWhat is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist?Thesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdccuuid:248d2c20-261c-4fcf-8c0b-1de74822812fModern Western philosophyPhilosophyEthics (Moral philosophy)EnglishOxford University Research Archive - Valet2013Clark, WWilliam ClarkParsons, JThis paper addresses the question of how to distinguish moral realism from moral anti-realism. An influential view, prevalent primarily due to the work of Michael Dummett, appeals to semantic features of realism such as truth, bivalence, and surface form. However, minimalist accounts enable an anti-realist to appropriate any such semantic feature. The semantic characterisation is thus unable to distinguish adequately between moral realists and moral anti-realists. This is the problem of Creeping Minimalism. An alternative characterisation of the debate is proposed, making use of the distinctively metaphysical criteria of ontological inclusion/exclusion. Semantic minimalism is not an issue here, and the possibility of minimalism about ontology is shown to be incompatible with both realism and anti-realism, thus preventing the recurrence of Creeping Minimalism.
spellingShingle Modern Western philosophy
Philosophy
Ethics (Moral philosophy)
Clark, W
William Clark
What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist?
title What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist?
title_full What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist?
title_fullStr What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist?
title_full_unstemmed What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist?
title_short What is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti-realist?
title_sort what is the difference between a moral realist and a moral anti realist
topic Modern Western philosophy
Philosophy
Ethics (Moral philosophy)
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