Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies.
We characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Blackwell Publishing
2000
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| _version_ | 1826263609753206784 |
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| author | Neary, J Leahy, D |
| author_facet | Neary, J Leahy, D |
| author_sort | Neary, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's "animal spirits" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D; spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and also extensions to constrained second-best policies. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:54:31Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:251a6ceb-6995-4cf4-b69a-02b455c7f809 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:54:31Z |
| publishDate | 2000 |
| publisher | Blackwell Publishing |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:251a6ceb-6995-4cf4-b69a-02b455c7f8092022-03-26T11:53:51ZStrategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:251a6ceb-6995-4cf4-b69a-02b455c7f809EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsBlackwell Publishing2000Neary, JLeahy, DWe characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's "animal spirits" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D; spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and also extensions to constrained second-best policies. |
| spellingShingle | Neary, J Leahy, D Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies. |
| title | Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies. |
| title_full | Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies. |
| title_fullStr | Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies. |
| title_short | Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies. |
| title_sort | strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nearyj strategictradeandindustrialpolicytowardsdynamicoligopolies AT leahyd strategictradeandindustrialpolicytowardsdynamicoligopolies |