Relating to ourselves without a self: Eckhart and neuroscience
This paper questions models of identity that take individual consciousness as a focus, comparing the understanding of subjectivity in Eckhart's work to that found in recent empirical studies of the forms and mechanisms of social cognition. The argument begins by questioning the instrumental pur...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Routledge
2015
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| Summary: | This paper questions models of identity that take individual consciousness as a focus, comparing the understanding of subjectivity in Eckhart's work to that found in recent empirical studies of the forms and mechanisms of social cognition. The argument begins by questioning the instrumental purpose of recent research into meditative states. Researchers in this field pursue a goal-orientated agenda, which is in stark contrast to Eckhart's non-agenda and relinquishment of control. A close reading of Sermon Q69 then shows how Eckhart challenges our intellectual habits and first-person perspective, suggesting that what he calls our ‘intellect’ can be without instrumental assumptions: pure surprise. In the last part, the paper compares Eckhart's exhortation that we intelligently accept insecurity with recent research into automated responses and mirror neurons. The findings of this research present a model of human identity comparable to Eckhart's: one which questions the focus on consciousness and control associated with Cartesian and Kantian models of human identity. |
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