Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets.
Empirical evidence suggests that a Prime Minister can benefit from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which a minister's exposure to scandals is positvely related to his policy activism, so that a Prime Minister may wish to protect him from resignatio...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| 格式: | Working paper |
| 语言: | English |
| 出版: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2005
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| _version_ | 1826263706467565568 |
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| author | Dewan, T Myatt, D |
| author_facet | Dewan, T Myatt, D |
| author_sort | Dewan, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Empirical evidence suggests that a Prime Minister can benefit from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which a minister's exposure to scandals is positvely related to his policy activism, so that a Prime Minister may wish to protect him from resignation calls. We find that protection can sometimes work against the objective of encouraging activism: it makes a minister's position more valuable to him and hence can encourage him to "sit tight" by moderating his activities. On the other hand, an exogenous increase in exposure to scandals may lead a minister to "live for today" by pursuing controversial policy innovations. The Prime Minister's ability to protect ministers from resignation calls is limited by her short-term incentive to fire. She may, however, enhance her credibility by building a collective reputation with the wider membership of her cabinet; we show that heterogeneity of cabinet membership can play an important role. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:56:04Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:25a46df9-7dc8-4b97-bdd6-0bf02f0b3060 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:56:04Z |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publisher | Department of Economics (University of Oxford) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:25a46df9-7dc8-4b97-bdd6-0bf02f0b30602022-03-26T11:56:37ZScandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:25a46df9-7dc8-4b97-bdd6-0bf02f0b3060EnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2005Dewan, TMyatt, DEmpirical evidence suggests that a Prime Minister can benefit from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which a minister's exposure to scandals is positvely related to his policy activism, so that a Prime Minister may wish to protect him from resignation calls. We find that protection can sometimes work against the objective of encouraging activism: it makes a minister's position more valuable to him and hence can encourage him to "sit tight" by moderating his activities. On the other hand, an exogenous increase in exposure to scandals may lead a minister to "live for today" by pursuing controversial policy innovations. The Prime Minister's ability to protect ministers from resignation calls is limited by her short-term incentive to fire. She may, however, enhance her credibility by building a collective reputation with the wider membership of her cabinet; we show that heterogeneity of cabinet membership can play an important role. |
| spellingShingle | Dewan, T Myatt, D Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets. |
| title | Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets. |
| title_full | Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets. |
| title_fullStr | Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets. |
| title_short | Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets. |
| title_sort | scandal protection and recovery in political cabinets |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dewant scandalprotectionandrecoveryinpoliticalcabinets AT myattd scandalprotectionandrecoveryinpoliticalcabinets |