On what we know about chance
The 'Principal Principle' states, roughly, that one's subjective probability for a proposition should conform to one's beliefs about that proposition's objective chance of coming true. David Lewis has argued (i) that this principle provides the defining role for chance; (ii)...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford University Press
2003
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| _version_ | 1826263756394463232 |
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| author | Arntzenius, F Hall, N |
| author2 | The British Society for the Philosophy of Science |
| author_facet | The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Arntzenius, F Hall, N |
| author_sort | Arntzenius, F |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The 'Principal Principle' states, roughly, that one's subjective probability for a proposition should conform to one's beliefs about that proposition's objective chance of coming true. David Lewis has argued (i) that this principle provides the defining role for chance; (ii) that it conflicts with his reductionist thesis of Humean supervenience, and so must be replaced by an amended version that avoids the conflict; hence (iii) that nothing <em>perfectly</em> deserves the name 'chance', although something can come close enough by playing the role picked out by the amended principle. We show that in fact there <em>must</em> be 'chances' that perfectly play what Lewis takes to be the defining role. But this is not the happy conclusion it might seem, since these 'chances' behave too strangely to deserve the name. The lesson is simple: much more than the Principal Principle - more to the point, much more than the connection between chance and credence - informs our understanding of objective chance. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:56:54Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:25eaa078-44cf-4aa9-8f83-7d41ccd724b0 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T19:56:54Z |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:25eaa078-44cf-4aa9-8f83-7d41ccd724b02022-03-26T11:58:09ZOn what we know about chanceJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:25eaa078-44cf-4aa9-8f83-7d41ccd724b0PhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetOxford University Press2003Arntzenius, FHall, NThe British Society for the Philosophy of ScienceThe 'Principal Principle' states, roughly, that one's subjective probability for a proposition should conform to one's beliefs about that proposition's objective chance of coming true. David Lewis has argued (i) that this principle provides the defining role for chance; (ii) that it conflicts with his reductionist thesis of Humean supervenience, and so must be replaced by an amended version that avoids the conflict; hence (iii) that nothing <em>perfectly</em> deserves the name 'chance', although something can come close enough by playing the role picked out by the amended principle. We show that in fact there <em>must</em> be 'chances' that perfectly play what Lewis takes to be the defining role. But this is not the happy conclusion it might seem, since these 'chances' behave too strangely to deserve the name. The lesson is simple: much more than the Principal Principle - more to the point, much more than the connection between chance and credence - informs our understanding of objective chance. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Arntzenius, F Hall, N On what we know about chance |
| title | On what we know about chance |
| title_full | On what we know about chance |
| title_fullStr | On what we know about chance |
| title_full_unstemmed | On what we know about chance |
| title_short | On what we know about chance |
| title_sort | on what we know about chance |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT arntzeniusf onwhatweknowaboutchance AT halln onwhatweknowaboutchance |