On what we know about chance
The 'Principal Principle' states, roughly, that one's subjective probability for a proposition should conform to one's beliefs about that proposition's objective chance of coming true. David Lewis has argued (i) that this principle provides the defining role for chance; (ii)...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | Arntzenius, F, Hall, N |
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Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | The British Society for the Philosophy of Science |
Μορφή: | Journal article |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Oxford University Press
2003
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Θέματα: |
Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
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