The literary example in moral philosophy today

The standard claim made for literary examples in moral philosophy is that they assist moral reasoning by offering appropriately complex descriptions of the conditions under which moral decisions are made or might plausibly be made. This essay offers a critical examination of that claim, exploring th...

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Main Author: Small, H
Format: Journal article
Published: Duke University Press 2013
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author Small, H
author_facet Small, H
author_sort Small, H
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description The standard claim made for literary examples in moral philosophy is that they assist moral reasoning by offering appropriately complex descriptions of the conditions under which moral decisions are made or might plausibly be made. This essay offers a critical examination of that claim, exploring the attractions of literary exemplarity for moral philosophy of several kinds since the 1960s but also the constrained terms under which the invitation to deep reflectiveness is permitted to operate. The essay then considers why many recent moral philosophers (with the partial exception of Bernard Williams) have preferred quasi- or faux-literary examples, developing a kind of stripped-down or gestural literariness that offers the benefits of just enough, not too much, complexity.
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spelling oxford-uuid:26d6d53a-4254-4717-9f7d-61be44f0e6db2022-03-26T12:03:28ZThe literary example in moral philosophy todayJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:26d6d53a-4254-4717-9f7d-61be44f0e6dbSymplectic Elements at OxfordDuke University Press2013Small, HThe standard claim made for literary examples in moral philosophy is that they assist moral reasoning by offering appropriately complex descriptions of the conditions under which moral decisions are made or might plausibly be made. This essay offers a critical examination of that claim, exploring the attractions of literary exemplarity for moral philosophy of several kinds since the 1960s but also the constrained terms under which the invitation to deep reflectiveness is permitted to operate. The essay then considers why many recent moral philosophers (with the partial exception of Bernard Williams) have preferred quasi- or faux-literary examples, developing a kind of stripped-down or gestural literariness that offers the benefits of just enough, not too much, complexity.
spellingShingle Small, H
The literary example in moral philosophy today
title The literary example in moral philosophy today
title_full The literary example in moral philosophy today
title_fullStr The literary example in moral philosophy today
title_full_unstemmed The literary example in moral philosophy today
title_short The literary example in moral philosophy today
title_sort literary example in moral philosophy today
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