Labor Market Structures and the Sacrifice Ratio.

Using OECD panel data for 1961–2000 we provide evidence that the output cost associated with disinflation (the sacrifice ratio) decreases with coordination between wage-setters in the labor market. The relationship holds for alternative measures of labor market coordination and after controlling for...

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Päätekijät: Bowdler, C, Nunziata, L
Aineistotyyppi: Journal article
Kieli:English
Julkaistu: Elsevier 2010
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author Bowdler, C
Nunziata, L
author_facet Bowdler, C
Nunziata, L
author_sort Bowdler, C
collection OXFORD
description Using OECD panel data for 1961–2000 we provide evidence that the output cost associated with disinflation (the sacrifice ratio) decreases with coordination between wage-setters in the labor market. The relationship holds for alternative measures of labor market coordination and after controlling for standard sacrifice ratio determinants. The sign of the relationship is robust across alternative definitions of the sacrifice ratio, but its statistical significance varies. Our results also indicate that more stringent employment protection laws increase sacrifice ratios, but the effect is not significant at conventional levels. We provide explanations for our findings based on the speed of nominal wage adjustment in New Keynesian models.
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spelling oxford-uuid:276362e8-2ba2-4f62-a33b-b7ba3a59ba892022-03-26T12:06:40ZLabor Market Structures and the Sacrifice Ratio.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:276362e8-2ba2-4f62-a33b-b7ba3a59ba89EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsElsevier2010Bowdler, CNunziata, LUsing OECD panel data for 1961–2000 we provide evidence that the output cost associated with disinflation (the sacrifice ratio) decreases with coordination between wage-setters in the labor market. The relationship holds for alternative measures of labor market coordination and after controlling for standard sacrifice ratio determinants. The sign of the relationship is robust across alternative definitions of the sacrifice ratio, but its statistical significance varies. Our results also indicate that more stringent employment protection laws increase sacrifice ratios, but the effect is not significant at conventional levels. We provide explanations for our findings based on the speed of nominal wage adjustment in New Keynesian models.
spellingShingle Bowdler, C
Nunziata, L
Labor Market Structures and the Sacrifice Ratio.
title Labor Market Structures and the Sacrifice Ratio.
title_full Labor Market Structures and the Sacrifice Ratio.
title_fullStr Labor Market Structures and the Sacrifice Ratio.
title_full_unstemmed Labor Market Structures and the Sacrifice Ratio.
title_short Labor Market Structures and the Sacrifice Ratio.
title_sort labor market structures and the sacrifice ratio
work_keys_str_mv AT bowdlerc labormarketstructuresandthesacrificeratio
AT nunziatal labormarketstructuresandthesacrificeratio