Experience and self-consciousness
Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers "yes". I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer-a well-known regress argument, what I call the "intervie...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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2009
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| _version_ | 1826264153777504256 |
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| author | Schear, J |
| author_facet | Schear, J |
| author_sort | Schear, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers "yes". I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer-a well-known regress argument, what I call the "interview argument," and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:03:11Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:28067f81-1cb3-4b6b-a4a1-b8664669dd11 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:03:11Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:28067f81-1cb3-4b6b-a4a1-b8664669dd112022-03-26T12:10:20ZExperience and self-consciousnessJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:28067f81-1cb3-4b6b-a4a1-b8664669dd11EnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2009Schear, JDoes all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers "yes". I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer-a well-known regress argument, what I call the "interview argument," and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. |
| spellingShingle | Schear, J Experience and self-consciousness |
| title | Experience and self-consciousness |
| title_full | Experience and self-consciousness |
| title_fullStr | Experience and self-consciousness |
| title_full_unstemmed | Experience and self-consciousness |
| title_short | Experience and self-consciousness |
| title_sort | experience and self consciousness |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT schearj experienceandselfconsciousness |