DISHONESTY AND THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE
The handicap principle states that stable biological signals must be honest. Here, it is argued that they need only be honest 'on average'. If signallers employ a number of different signalling strategies at equilibrium, then the handicap principle cannot entirely rule out dishonesty. A fo...
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| Format: | Journal article |
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1993
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| _version_ | 1826264172682280960 |
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| author | Johnstone, R Grafen, A |
| author_facet | Johnstone, R Grafen, A |
| author_sort | Johnstone, R |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The handicap principle states that stable biological signals must be honest. Here, it is argued that they need only be honest 'on average'. If signallers employ a number of different signalling strategies at equilibrium, then the handicap principle cannot entirely rule out dishonesty. A formal demonstration of this possibility, using evolutionarily stable strategy techniques, is provided and the conditions that might lead to the evolution of multiple signalling strategies are discussed. It is concluded that the ideal of perfect honesty will almost never be met. Copyright © 1993 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. All rights reserved. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:03:29Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:28220392-f3d0-4602-b9d2-97b2312196e0 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T20:03:29Z |
| publishDate | 1993 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:28220392-f3d0-4602-b9d2-97b2312196e02022-03-26T12:10:53ZDISHONESTY AND THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLEJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:28220392-f3d0-4602-b9d2-97b2312196e0Symplectic Elements at Oxford1993Johnstone, RGrafen, AThe handicap principle states that stable biological signals must be honest. Here, it is argued that they need only be honest 'on average'. If signallers employ a number of different signalling strategies at equilibrium, then the handicap principle cannot entirely rule out dishonesty. A formal demonstration of this possibility, using evolutionarily stable strategy techniques, is provided and the conditions that might lead to the evolution of multiple signalling strategies are discussed. It is concluded that the ideal of perfect honesty will almost never be met. Copyright © 1993 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. All rights reserved. |
| spellingShingle | Johnstone, R Grafen, A DISHONESTY AND THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE |
| title | DISHONESTY AND THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE |
| title_full | DISHONESTY AND THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE |
| title_fullStr | DISHONESTY AND THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE |
| title_full_unstemmed | DISHONESTY AND THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE |
| title_short | DISHONESTY AND THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE |
| title_sort | dishonesty and the handicap principle |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT johnstoner dishonestyandthehandicapprinciple AT grafena dishonestyandthehandicapprinciple |