Some Economics of Abuse of Dominance.

The paper offers an economic appraisal of selected aspects of EC law and policy towards abuse of dominance (Article 82). After a brief discussion of thresholds for dominance, five theories of exclusionary harm to compeptition are outlined, concerning: predatory pricing, partial exclusion to exploit...

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Päätekijä: Vickers, J
Aineistotyyppi: Working paper
Kieli:English
Julkaistu: Department of Economics (University of Oxford) 2007
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author Vickers, J
author_facet Vickers, J
author_sort Vickers, J
collection OXFORD
description The paper offers an economic appraisal of selected aspects of EC law and policy towards abuse of dominance (Article 82). After a brief discussion of thresholds for dominance, five theories of exclusionary harm to compeptition are outlined, concerning: predatory pricing, partial exclusion to exploit rivals, divide-and-rule exclusion, leverage of market power, and maintenance of market power. Issues arising in three EC cases on which judgment was given in 2007 are then discussed in the light of these theories: Wanadoo (predatory pricing), British Airways (discounts and rebates), and Microsoft (refusal to supply, tying and bundling). Implications and prospects for the development of better economics-grounded EC law and policy towards abuse of dominance are discussed in conclusion.
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spelling oxford-uuid:28525a82-3128-4ea2-9343-f56af27fa2302022-03-26T12:12:11ZSome Economics of Abuse of Dominance.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:28525a82-3128-4ea2-9343-f56af27fa230EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2007Vickers, JThe paper offers an economic appraisal of selected aspects of EC law and policy towards abuse of dominance (Article 82). After a brief discussion of thresholds for dominance, five theories of exclusionary harm to compeptition are outlined, concerning: predatory pricing, partial exclusion to exploit rivals, divide-and-rule exclusion, leverage of market power, and maintenance of market power. Issues arising in three EC cases on which judgment was given in 2007 are then discussed in the light of these theories: Wanadoo (predatory pricing), British Airways (discounts and rebates), and Microsoft (refusal to supply, tying and bundling). Implications and prospects for the development of better economics-grounded EC law and policy towards abuse of dominance are discussed in conclusion.
spellingShingle Vickers, J
Some Economics of Abuse of Dominance.
title Some Economics of Abuse of Dominance.
title_full Some Economics of Abuse of Dominance.
title_fullStr Some Economics of Abuse of Dominance.
title_full_unstemmed Some Economics of Abuse of Dominance.
title_short Some Economics of Abuse of Dominance.
title_sort some economics of abuse of dominance
work_keys_str_mv AT vickersj someeconomicsofabuseofdominance